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SOCIAL NETWORKING
AS A COMMUNICATIONS
WEAPON TO HARM VICTIMS:
FACEBOOK, MYSPACE, AND
TWITTER DEMONSTRATE A NEED
TO AMEND SECTION 230 OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
JOSHUA N. AZRIEL,* PHD
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networking allows individuals to communicate directly
with friends, family, colleagues, and acquaintances using a variety of
techniques such as posting online “status” updates, photos, videos, and
instant messages.  Popular online resources such as Twitter, Facebook,
MySpace, and YouTube allow members to generate a variety of content
for their followers.  Many of these tools are used in innocent, harmless
ways for individuals to connect with friends and family.  While these ap-
plications enable the user to control content without direct third-party
Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) editorial assistance or censorship,
there is a growing danger that this side of citizen-led media is generating
an abundance of offensive, defamatory content.
Celebrities in Hollywood have also entered the social networking
foray to expand their fan bases, a move that brings legal risk.1  For ex-
ample, on March 17, 2009, clothing designer Dawn Simorangkir, alleged
she was the victim of a public online rant by musician and actress
Courtney Love.2  In her lawsuit filed on March 26, 2009, Simorangkir
* Assistant Professor of Communication, Kennesaw  State University. PhD, Journal-
ism and Communications, University of Florida.
1. Kaplan, Ben, Ashton Kutcher, Actor, Punk’r and Cheat’r?; Hyped Twitter Competi-
tion with CNN not all that it Claims to be, NAT’L POST, Apr. 21, 2009 at AL1.  In 2009
Ashton Kutcher competed against CNN in a contest over who could amass more followers
on Twitter.
2. Civil Complaint at 6, Simorangkir v. Love, 2009 WL 798260 (LA Co. CA, filed
March 26, 2009) (No. BC410593).
415
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said that Love defamed her on Twitter.3  She claimed that Love tweeted
(communicated with her Twitter followers) that Simorangkir was a felon,
had an illegal drug problem, and had a history of assault and burglary.4
Regardless of the outcome of this lawsuit, this incident illustrates
the manner in which social networking tools may be used as conduits to
post offensive, slanderous content.  As websites like Twitter, Facebook,
and YouTube grow in member-generated content, there is an ever-grow-
ing risk that individuals are posting illicit materials.  So far in 2009,
there are more than 250 pending lawsuits generally related to blogs, in-
cluding some based on defamation.5  The number of these types of law-
suits has more than doubled since 2008.6
Defamation occurs when an individual’s reputation is harmed by a
direct statement that is made public to a third-party audience.7  Social
networking tools such as Twitter and Facebook allow users to easily post
this type of defamatory material in the public domain where it could be
viewed by thousands or potentially millions of others.  With the majority
of online content created by private individuals, many Internet-based
defamation lawsuits come from messages posted with the intent to
threaten, harass, or defame a victim before a potentially large “audience”
of followers.  Recent court cases reflect a growing trend of individuals
who used social networking as a public forum for posting harmful
content.8
The lawsuit Simorangkir filed against Love illustrates that individu-
als, not their ISPs or other users, are responsible for the content they
create. As some of the fastest growing communication tools, it is not sur-
prising that Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter are often the social
networking sources used in the growing number of incidents.
Several state and federal courts have consistently upheld Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) that exempts ISPs and
other users from any responsibility related to offensive content posted on
the Internet.9  The law defines offensive content as material that is ob-
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Garry Marr, Tweet This: You’re Being Sued, NAT’L POST, May 2, 2009, at FW5,
available at http://www.nationalpost.com/scripts/story.html?id=1555623.
6. Id.
7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (7th ed. 2000).
8. See e.g. Wolfe v. Fayettville, Ark. Sch. Dist. 600 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (W.D. Ark. 2009);
ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Barrett v. Rosen-
thal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).
9. 47 U.S.C. §230 (c)(2) (2009) (stating: “No provider or user of an interactive com-
puter service shall be held liable on account of. . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith
to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected”). See e.g. Green v. America
\\server05\productn\S\SFT\26-3\SFT304.txt unknown Seq: 3 20-NOV-09 13:28
2009] SOCIAL NETWORKING AS WEAPON 417
scene, lewd, excessively violent, or harassing.10  Social networking tools
make it possible for law enforcement agencies and courts to determine
the actual identity of those perpetrating these offensive messages.
Rather than use pseudonyms, many customers of these sites are now us-
ing their real identities when they link with their friends, family, and co-
workers.
This article discusses how social networking sites can pose a danger
to victims of online offensive content.  Part II provides an overall analy-
sis of the dangers the Internet, especially social networking, poses to vic-
tims.  Part III reviews Section 230 of the CDA, including the “Good
Samaritan” provisions for social networking websites such as Twitter
and Facebook.  Part IV analyzes three recent court cases that demon-
strate how these social networking tools are used as weapons to harm
victims.  Part V concludes with a discussion of how the growing number
of online incidents stem from social networking sites.  It recommends
that Congress should amend the CDA to clarify the penalty for individu-
als who post offensive content on the Internet, including social network-
ing sites.
II. THE RISE OF DIGITAL FREE SPEECH AND THE DANGERS
IT POSES
Yale Law School First Amendment scholar Jack Balkin recently
noted that in the digital age of Internet communication, basic First
Amendment values are critical: the freedom to express and promote
ideas, opinion, and scholarship.11  He compared the online environment
of blogging, search engines, and social networking to the Enlightenment
Era when the printing press was the technology for distributing books
and pamphlets across Europe.12  Balkin argued that what will define the
future free speech legal debate related to the Internet will not be large,
constitutional issues, but rather regulatory ones related to its business
model and the activities of its users.13
Social networking tools such as Facebook and MySpace are a part of
what is termed “Web 2.0.”  According to Cecilia Ziniti, Web 2.0 online
services do not simply give users access to the Internet and a voice on-
line.  Rather, they “help find, manage, and explore the data within the
Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465 (3rd Cir. 2003); Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327
(4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
10. 47 U.S.C. §230 (c)(2) (2009).
11. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech and Press in the Digital Age: The Future of the Free
Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427 (2009).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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web to make it useful.”14  The value of these social media tools is propor-
tionate to the amount of data the websites help manage.15  Web 2.0 pro-
grams rely on users to input their opinions through surveys and ratings
to constantly improve service.16  Customers rely on these Web 2.0 pro-
grams to help them sift through large amounts of content such as photos,
blog entries, and video so their networked “friends” can quickly find spe-
cific content.  These social network programs give customers the tools to
publish their content.
Web 2.0 has expanded the “digital speech” that permeates our cul-
ture by allowing users to share continually interactive communications
with one another.17  A lot of this interaction is virtual communication
within Facebook and MySpace communities.  Jack Balkin argued that
protecting free speech values in this digital age will not pose a problem
for constitutional law but instead will be an administrative and techno-
logical challenge.18  He cited network neutrality and intermediary liabil-
ity as the keys to protecting online free speech.  Balkin explained that
the debate on network neutrality will be focused on whether corporate
Internet providers stay editorially neutral about content.19  Intermedi-
ary liability refers to the online companies who deliver content, such as
Yahoo!, Facebook, or Google. Section 230 of the CDA immunizes these
online companies from any liability for offensive messages placed on
their communication platforms.  Balkin believed that as long as network
neutrality and intermediary liability do not interfere with content, then
free speech will continue in the digital realm.20  Another perspective on
digital speech is that it is revolutionary because it presents a novel form
for creating and disseminating content for people who may previously
have been shut out of the public domain.21  Caitlin Hall proposed in 2008
that digital speech offers forms of communication through social
networks.22
Yet, despite the enhanced speech freedoms in online communication,
there are dangers to potential victims in the legal areas of privacy,
threats, emotional distress, and defamation.  The Internet provides tools
to mask one’s identity, creating an environment that could lead to inci-
14. Cecilia Ziniti, Annual Review 2008: CYBERLAW: Note: The Optimal Liability Sys-
tem for Online Service Providers: How Zeran v. America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0




18. Balkin, supra note 11, at 442.
19. Id. at 431.
20. Id. at 433.
21. Caitlin Hall, Note, A Regulatory Proposal for Digital Defamation: Conditioning
§ 230 Safe Harbor on the Provision of a Site “Rating,” 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008).
22. Id.
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dents of anonymous libel.23  Hall noted that in the virtual world of the
Internet, when a victim is libeled, the third-person viewing audience and
any accompanying victim’s rebuttal are ever-changing in a growing ar-
ray of posted comments.24
Incidents of cyberharassment are on the rise.25  Generically, in the
offline world, “harassment” is defined as words or conduct that annoy,
alarm, or cause emotional distress in the victim for no “legitimate” pur-
pose.26  According to Sarah Jameson, computers complicate the defini-
tion of harassment because they allow individuals to use e-mail or blogs
to torment their victims.27  The Internet allows people to conceal their
identities causing further stress on a victim.28  In 2008 Jameson used
the term “cyberharassment” to include cyberstalking and cyberbully-
ing.29 She noted that the difference between cyberharassment and cyber-
stalking usually turns on perpetrators’ objectives and motives for their
behavior.30 Cyberharassment is defined as an individual’s attempt to
frighten or embarrass the victim.31 Conversely, “cyberstalking is charac-
terized as a perpetrator relentlessly pursuing a victim online, likely in
combination with an offline,” real world attack.32  Cyberbullying refers
to intentionally aggressive behavior, often by children and teenagers, in-
volving an imbalance of power or strength between aggressor and
victim.33
The anonymity of the Internet creates a challenge in identifying
public versus private spaces.34  Jameson noted the Internet complicates
privacy issues because information that is initially intended to be private
easily becomes public.35  The result is that thousands or even millions of
online viewers can see information never intended for a large audience.36
Jameson warned that this level of scrutiny can easily lead to an individ-
ual becoming the victim of cyberharassment based on private informa-
tion in the public eye.37
23. Id.
24. Id. at 4.
25. Sarah Jameson, Cyberharassment: Striking a Balance Between Free Speech and
Privacy, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 231, 235 (2008).




30. Id. at 236.
31. Jameson, supra note 25, at 236.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 236.
34. Id. at 240.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Jameson, supra note 25, at 240.
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III. HISTORY OF SECTION 230 OF THE CDA
When Congress passed into law the Telecommunications Act of
1996, it was aimed at deregulating the telecommunications industry, in-
cluding ownership restrictions.38  One part of the law, the CDA, ex-
empted ISPs and other users of an interactive computer service from
being held responsible for any posted materials from third-party users
that are excessively violent, harassing, or defamatory.39  This was en-
acted in order to promote self-regulation of the Internet without direct
government oversight.40
Congress’ goal in passing the CDA was to provide a legal framework
for the Internet to flourish in several areas including political discourse,
cultural development, intellectual development, and entertainment.41  It
opposed a law that restricted Internet growth. Instead, Congress tried to
preserve the “free market nature” of the online communications me-
dium.42  Congress did not want ISPs bogged down by an avalanche of
lawsuits related to questionable speech practices by third parties.  It
feared the potential for chilled online speech resulting from the 1995 de-
cision of Stratton Oakmont 43 in New York.  In Stratton Oakmont, the
Nassau County Supreme Court held Prodigy Services liable for defama-
tory material posted on its “Money Talk” electronic bulletin board.44  The
court held that the ISP was the publisher of the website and responsible
38. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 562 (Feb. 8, 1996).
39. 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(c)(2) (2009). Title 47 Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radiotele-
graphs – Chapter 5 Wire or Radio Communication Common Carriers, Common Carrier
Regulation states that:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on ac-
count of. . .any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availa-
bility of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected. Id.
40. Id.
41. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2009). “The Internet and other interactive computer services
offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.” Id.  Section (a)(4) states, “The
Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Amer-
icans, with a minimum of government regulation.” Id. at § 230(a)(4).  Section (a)(5) states,
“Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educa-
tional, cultural, and entertainment services.” Id. at § 230(a)(5).
42. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2009).
It is the policy of the United States. . .(1) to promote the continued development of
the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or
State regulation. Id.
43. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup.
1995).
44. Id.
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for the editorial content posted by the Money Talk editorial staff.45
Congress responded to the Stratton Oakmont decision by passing
Section 230 of the CDA. The 1996 Senate-House Conference Report
stated that one of the goals of the law was to overrule Stratton Oakmont
by granting ISPs an exemption from liability for objectionable material
written by unknown third parties.46  Congress did not want ISPs and
other users to be treated as publishers or speakers of content that was
not their own.47
Social networking websites such as Facebook and Twitter have spe-
cific guidelines that reflect Section 230’s “Good Samaritan” clause.48  The
federal law states that “no provider of an interactive computer service
shall be held liable [for offensive content if it makes a] good faith [effort]
to restrict access or availability of the material.”49  Facebook’s Statement
of Rights and Responsibilities reflects the Good Samaritan clause as it
expressively forbids content that intimidates, harasses, threatens, or is
graphically violent.50  Yet, it also says that it cannot solely patrol the site
for offensive content, and Facebook asks its members for assistance.51
Twitter’s “Good Samaritan” clause is similar.52  Twitter warns its cus-
tomers not to harass or threaten others and not to use it generally for
45. Id. at *13.
46. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10.
47. Id. at 194. The Conference Report stated:
One of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v.
Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers and
users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have
restricted access to objectionable material.  The conferees believe that such deci-
sions create serious obstacles to the important federal policy of empowering par-
ents to determine the content of communications their children receive through
interactive computers services. Id.
48. 47 USCS § 230(c) (2009).
49. Id. Section (c)(2) states:
Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of— (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be ob-
scene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objec-
tionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected. Id.
50. Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, http://www.facebook.com/
terms.php?ref=pf (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).  Facebook’s Safety Section of the Statement
of Rights and Responsibilities specifically warns its users:
1.You will not bully, intimidate, or harass any user. 2.You will not post content
that is hateful, threatening, pornographic, or that contains nudity or graphic or
gratuitous violence. . .4.You will not develop or operate a third party application
containing, or advertise or otherwise You will not use Facebook to do anything
unlawful, misleading, malicious, or discriminatory. Id.
51. Id. Faceboook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities: 3. Safety: “We do our
best to keep Facebook safe, but we cannot guarantee it. We need your help in order to do
that. . .”
52. Twitter, Terms of Service, http://twitter.com/tos (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).Twit-
ter’s Terms of Service include: “You must not abuse, harass, threaten, impersonate or in-
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any illegal purposes.53  By informing its customers not to post any offen-
sive materials in violation of Section 230, both Facebook and Twitter ad-
here to the Good Samaritan clause of the law, in turn, granting them
immunity from any illegal content posted by its customers.
ISPs such as America Online, MSN, or Yahoo! are typically classi-
fied as content distributors because they make information provided by
third parties available to subscribers of their interactive computer ser-
vices. According to the CDA, these ISPs are distributors of information
and therefore are exempt from any liability.54  While the law exempts
ISPs as distributors of offensive information, it also excuses users of in-
teractive computer services from being held liable when they repost on-
line materials that are harassing or defamatory.55  By exempting users,
the legal distinction of who is a publisher of materials versus who is a
distributor is important.  “Users” can be a company or an individual who
simply forwards materials on the Internet written by other third parties.
Similar to ISPs, by law they are considered content distributors.
Federal and state courts have upheld Congress’ authority to exempt
ISPs from liability when defamatory or threatening statements are made
on their servers.56  They have ruled that the CDA exempts ISPs, but not
the actual authors, of any offensive online materials, including those
deemed threatening or defamatory.  The first post-Stratton Oakmont de-
cision was Zeran v. American Online in 1997.57  In Zeran, Kenneth
Zeran sued AOL because it did not remove messages from one of its bul-
letin boards that informed its members to call his telephone number to
purchase “naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts.”58  This prank against Zeran
was posted online after the April 19, 1995, Oklahoma City bombing of
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building.59  He repeatedly asked AOL to
remove the bulletin board posting after receiving hundreds of angry tele-
phone messages.  AOL complied after the initial damage was done.
Zeran sued AOL as both the publisher and distributor of the message.
A federal district court ruled that the 1996 CDA exempted ISPs such
timidate other Twitter users. . .You may not use the Twitter.com service for any illegal or
unauthorized purpose.”
53. Id.
54. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2007). “No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another infor-
mation content provider.”
55. Id.
56. See Green v. America Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465 (3rd Cir. 2003); Zeran v. America
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44 (D.D.C.
1998).
57. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327.
58. Id. at 328.
59. Id. at 329.
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as AOL from any liability for defamatory messages.60  The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the decision.61  The appellate
court reiterated that the federal law exempts ISPs from any responsibil-
ity for what their customers say on their websites. The Zeran decision is
often cited by other courts in similar lawsuits.62
While most court decisions centered on ISP liability for offensive
content, there has been little litigation concerning non-ISP users who
have also distributed similar content.  In November 2006, the Supreme
Court of California issued a ruling involving a private user who for-
warded defamatory online material.63  In Barrett v. Rosenthal, Califor-
nia’s highest court overturned a court of appeals ruling that Ilena
Rosenthal defamed plaintiffs Doctors Stephen Barrett and Timothy
Polevoy in an online news group.64  It ruled that Rosenthal did not vio-
late Section 230 of the CDA which states “providers” or users will not be
considered publishers or speakers of any information provided by an-
other information content provider.65
In Barrett, Ilena Rosenthal forwarded a copy of an article, originally
written by an unknown third party, to two health-themed news groups.66
She received the article as an e-mail attachment from her co-defendant,
Tim Bolen.67  Bolen labeled the article “Opinion of Tim Bolen” even
though it was originally written by an unknown party.68  The article de-
scribed the plaintiff, Dr. Barrett, as arrogant, emotionally disturbed, and
a bully.69  From the Court’s perspective, the phrase “Opinion of Tim Bo-
len” did not change the defendants’ statuses from users to publishers.70
The California Supreme Court ruled that since Rosenthal was not the
original author of the article, she was not responsible for its defamatory
content.71  As a “user” of the content, she did not violate Section 230 of
the CDA.  The Court noted that the immunity part of the statute does
not just protect ISPs but users who repost any offensive material.72  This
60. Id. at 329-30.
61. Id. at 335.
62. See, e.g., Green, 318 F.3d at 471;   Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C.
1998).
63. Barrett , 146 P.3d at 510.
64. Id. at 529.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 514.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Barrett, 146 P.3d at 514.
70. Id. at 527.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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federal immunity extends to state laws as well.73
In Barrett, the Court noted the danger of its ruling: “The prospect of
blanket immunity for those who intentionally redistribute defamatory
statements on the Internet has disturbing implications.”74  In upholding
Section 230, the Court gave users the right to knowingly repost or for-
ward offensive content even if they were not the original authors.  In the
concurring opinion, Justice Moreno warned that the court’s ruling did
not account for the danger of a “conspiracy” if a user actively works with
a publisher to distribute defamatory materials online.75  One person
could use a pseudonym to electronically publish offensive information
while the other person whose identity is not hidden has the legal author-
ity to promote it by reposting and forwarding the content.
IV. SOCIAL NETWORKING USED AS A TOOL TO HARM
Three recent cases since January 2009 highlight how social network-
ing websites such as Facebook and Twitter are now used as instruments
to harm victims.76  While the cases themselves share little in common,
they do reflect how social networking can be used as a psychological
weapon to intimidate, defame, and mobilize opinions against others.
A. CALIFORNIA’S 2008 PROPOSITION 8 BALLOT INITIATIVE
  In November 2008, California voters approved Proposition 8 that con-
stitutionally defined marriage as an institution between a man and a
woman.77  One of the sponsors of Proposition 8 was The National Organ-
ization for Marriage (“NOM”).  California’s Political Reform Act of 1974
requires political campaign organizations, like NOM, to file financial
contribution statements semi-annually.78  NOM sued the California Sec-
retary of State requesting it be exempt from the January 31, 2009 dead-
line for filing the statements.79 It alleged that many of its financial
contributors were threatened and harassed because of their support for
Proposition 8.80  During the campaign, threats were made in-person, by
73. Id. The court quoted from 47 USCS § 230 (e)(3) of the CDA: “Nothing in this law
shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with
this section. No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”
74. Barrett, 146 P.3d at 529.
75. Id.
76. See ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F.Supp. 2d 1197 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Wolfe v.
Fayettville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 600 F.Supp. 2d 1011 (W.D. Ark. 2009); Civil Complaint at 6,
Simorangkir v. Love, 2009 WL 798260 (LA Co. CA, filed March 26, 2009) (No. BC410593).
77. ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at  1199.
78. CAL. GOV. CODE § 84200 (2009).
79. ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1197, 1199.
80. Id. at 1200.
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telephone, and online against supporters of Proposition 8.81
One of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit, John Doe 1, donated funds to
ProtectMarriage.com as an active supporter of the ballot initiative.82  He
alleged that opponents of Proposition 8 used Facebook to target him by
organizing a boycott of his business. John Doe 1 considered this boycott
to be a threat to his economic livelihood.  He accused the supporters of
Proposition 8 of sponsoring a paid link on Google that referenced his bus-
iness as a supporter of the ballot measure.83  Another plaintiff in Pro-
tectMarriage.com who supported the ballot initiative alleged that he
received harassing messages on his MySpace and Facebook accounts
calling him a racist.84  A third plaintiff, John Doe 9, unknowingly had
his photo taken and, as a result of his public identity, received profane
and harassing messages in his MySpace and Facebook accounts.85 Since
several of their contributors were threatened and harassed, the plaintiffs
sought injunctive relief arguing they were entitled to an exemption from
California’s compelled financial disclosure laws.86  John Doe #9 argued
that this financial exemption is allowed under the state law when indi-
viduals believe their lives may be harmed if disclosure of names and do-
nation amounts are reported.87  John Doe #9 also challenged the
constitutionality of the $100 contribution threshold for disclosure.88
In its decision the court acknowledged the threats the plaintiffs re-
ceived during the course of the political campaign.89  Citing to the
United States Supreme Court’s 1976 opinion, Buckley v. Valeo, the court
acknowledged that in Buckley the Supreme Court left open the possibil-
ity that minor parties could seek immunity from financial disclosure re-
quirements if there was a reasonable probability their contributors were
suffering from threats, harassments, and reprisals.90
The court ruled that the difference between Buckley, and Pro-
tectMarriage.com  is that ProtectMarriage.com, as a political party, was
81. Id. at 1201-02.
82. Id. at 1201.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1203. John Doe 8 received messages that stated: “You’re as bad as the racist
white people who used to enjoy banning black people the same rights as them. The rest of
the world is disgusted by your actions.  Best start rethinking your position NOW!”
85. ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F.Supp 2d at 1203.
86. Id. at 1204.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1212.
90. Id.  See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 (1976). In Buckley, the Court affirmed
a lower appeals court decision on the government’s interest in restricting influences stem-
ming from the dependence of candidates on large campaign contributions, but the Court
reversed the finding on expenditure ceilings and ruled it unconstitutional.
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not a small, minor organization.91  It had succeeded in persuading a ma-
jority of California voters to support its cause.92  The court said this was
a “far cry” from smaller political parties who rarely succeed at the ballot
box.93 ProtectMarriage.com enjoyed solid financial support unlike other
minor political activist groups.94  Its members hold the majority view-
point in California which is unlikely to change: “there is no evidence that
any of the Plaintiffs’ contributors intend to retreat from the marketplace
of ideas such that available discourse will be materially dismissed.”95
In denying the financial disclosure exemption, the court in Pro-
tectMarriage.com said the threats and harassments were directed at a
small group of supporters out of thousands of contributors.96  While the
court condemned the offensive incidents, Judge Morrison England Jr.
stated that the legality of the threats was not the issue before the court,
but rather, his ruling reflected the exemption from financial disclosure
law appealed by the plaintiffs.97  He reminded the plaintiffs that they
had the option to pursue separate legal action for the alleged incidents.98
B. SOCIAL MEDIA USED AS A MEANS OF STUDENT HARASSMENT
In December 2006, a group of students in Fayetteville, Arkansas,
formed a Facebook group against middle school student, Billy Wolfe, for
his alleged homosexual orientation.99  The Facebook page was used as a
platform to call Wolfe a “little bitch.”100 An entry dated on March 8,
2007, by a student named “WS” said that he intended to ask a friend to
beat up Wolfe.101  That afternoon another student, “IT,” punched him in
the face.102  Another violent incident against Wolfe was videotaped and
posted on YouTube.103  Further harassing statements were posted on
Facebook again on March 25, 2008.104
Wolfe’s family filed a lawsuit against the Fayettville school district
and the middle school vice principal, Byron Zeagler, for sex discrimina-




95. Id. at 1215.
96. Id. at 1217.
97. ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.
98. Id.
99. Evie Blad, Networking Web Sites Enable New Generation of Bullies, ARK. DEMO-
CRAT-GAZETTE, Apr. 6, 2008, at 17.
100. Wolfe, 600 F. Supp. 2d  at 1017. In the “Group Info” section of the Facebook page,
the members wrote “[WW is] a little bitch. And [sic] a homosexual that NO ONE LIKES.”
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1018.
104. Id.
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tion, perceived sexual orientation discrimination, First Amendment re-
taliation, defamation, and false light.105  Zeagler was named in the
lawsuit because the family said he did little to protect Wolfe from the
harassment, threats, and violence.106  In the initial Wolfe hearing on the
alleged complaints, the defendants sought dismissal for these claims.107
In its decision, the Wolfe court granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss the sex discrimination complaints, but rejected their dismissal
request on the First Amendment retaliation, defamation, and false light
claims.108  The court found that there was enough evidence to proceed to
trial on these claims partly because Facebook was used as a social media
outreach tool against Wolfe.109  As this case proceeds to trial, which is
currently set for May 2010, the content on Facebook and YouTube may
well be used as evidence against the defense.
C. COURTNEY LOVE’S TWEETS BRING A LAWSUIT
Another recent incident involving social networking as a tool to de-
liver offensive content occurred in March of 2009.110  Clothing designer
Dawn Simorangkir alleged that she was a victim of Twitter and MyS-
pace rants by musician Courtney Love.111  She sued Love in Los Angeles
Superior Court for libel, false light, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, interfering with her economic livelihood, and breach of
contract.112
In the lawsuit, Simorangkir alleges that Love publicized malicious
and false statements related to selling illegal drugs, a history of assault
and burglary, a record of prostitution, and grand theft.113  Simorangkir
believes that Love’s accusations have damaged her business along with
her personal name and reputation.114  The complaint lists several spe-
cific examples of MySpace and Twitter entries where Love allegedly de-
famed Simorangkir.115  Many of the incidents occurred via Twitter in
mid-March 2009.116  For example, Simonrangkir stated that on March
17, 2009, Love tweeted that Simorangkir had a history of dealing co-
105. Id.
106. Wolfe, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 1017.
107. Id. at 1015.
108. Id. at 1024-25.
109. Id. at 1021.
110. Simorangkir, 2009 WL 798260.
111. Id. at 5.
112. Id. at 5 and 15-19.
113. Id. at 2.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 6.
116. Simorangkir, 2009 WL 798260 at 6.
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caine, assault, and burglary.117  The complaint listed ten tweets about
Simonrangkir in a 21-minute period on March 17, 2009.118  According to
the plaintiff, Love also posted a long, defamatory statement on MySpace
the same day.119  If this case proceeds to trial, Love’s alleged comments
on Twitter and MySpace would play an important role in its outcome.
V. CONCLUSION
Unlike ProtectMarriage.com and Wolfe, the proceedings in
Simorangkir v. Love reflect how social networking was the sole source of
communication used to possibly defame and invade the privacy of a vic-
tim.  As it becomes the norm in citizen-led media, there will doubtlessly
be more incidents of offensive material posted on Facebook or Twitter.
While Section 230 of the CDA immunizes ISPs, more individuals will be
held accountable for the content of their writings.
How users of social networking are held accountable will come at the
intersection of traditional libel and privacy laws and modern online com-
munication technology.  Congress could be the source of clarification.
Section 230 defines offensive content as material that is “obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectiona-
ble.”120  Since the definition of offensive content exists, Congress should
clarify who is exempt and who is liable.  Because ISPs and users are ex-
empt based on the Good Samaritan provisions, Congress should amend
the law so that individuals who create offensive content and post it di-
rectly on the Internet are liable and subject to prosecution.  This would
include messages that are defamatory, harassing, invade one’s privacy,
and generally damage a victim’s reputation.
If Congress does not take the initiative in clarifying the legal respon-
sibilities of individuals, then states should revisit their own defamation,
threat, harassment, and privacy laws.  Each state may have to include
provisions for Internet content that harms a victim in these legal areas.
Yet, even if state governments take this initiative, Section 230 of the
CDA could still trump any state law.  Section 230 has a provision that
117. Id. Love allegedly posted on Twitter that: “austin police are more than ecstatic to
pick her up she has a history of dealing cocaine lost all custody of her child, assault and
burglary” (published by Love on twitter.com/courtneylover79, March 17, 2009 at 7:27 PM).
118. Id. at 6-7.
119. Id. at 8-14.  Alleged MySpace postings included: “she remain a nasty piece of work
until she stops this madness and realizes that being in possession of half a MILLION dol-
lars worth of investments that took 7/8 years to collect is precious and to have a major
magazine doing a piece onnothing but her stuff, and 40 GRAND is far too much, she should
be on her knees praying to whatever god she has ( she’s a nihilistic black cludof negativity
hoverer higher poweris i don’t want it!)” (published by Love on www.myspace.com/
courtneylove on March 17, 2009, at 12:55 AM).
120. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2009).
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overrides state law if those state codes attempt to supersede the CDA.121
In its Barrett decision, the California Supreme Court ruled that the CDA
was the controlling legal authority in that state-based lawsuit.122  The
Court noted that its decision was a literal interpretation of the CDA.123
The Barrett decision created a legal paradigm that suggests the CDA
should be the law that holds individuals accountable for any offensive
content they post via social networking sites.
Congress or the states must act sooner rather than later.  The num-
ber of alleged incidents related to offensive content posted on social
networking sites such as Facebook or Twitter will only continue to rise.
The alleged incidents in ProtectMarriage.com, Wolfe, and Simorangkir
reflect only a small number of court cases in this legal area.  The courts
may well need further guidance from federal or state laws to assist them
in adjudicating these matters.
121. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (2009).  “State law. Nothing in this section shall be construed
to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No
cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local
law that is inconsistent with this section.” Id.
122. Barrett, 146 P.3d at 529.
123. Id.
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